

## IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN DISGUISE? *Civic Integration Policies and Immigrant Admission*

### Abstract

There has been a rapid diffusion of civic integration policies (CIPs) in Europe since the 21st century. The spread of CIPs has, however, been uneven across Europe, with some countries adopting civic integration strategies with tougher integration requirements, whereas others keeping more of a multicultural approach. The implementation of CIPs has mainly been motivated based on concerns about immigrant integration. As discussed in this article, however, an implied function of this policy framework is that immigrants who do not meet the conditions will face difficulties acquiring residence. This article develops and conducts a preliminary test of the argument that CIPs affect migration flows. The assumption is that CIPs provide states with tools to control and limit the inflow of immigration by a certain category of entry. The analysis lends support to the idea that there are connections between the extensions of CIPs and reductions in family immigration and labour immigration among European countries, which indicates that push for internal inclusion seems to come along with barriers of exclusion.

### Keywords

Civic integration policies • Immigrant admission • Integration requirements • Family immigration • Labour immigration

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### Introduction

Following the progression of contemporary flows of globalization and the accompanying deterritorialization of economic, political and social spaces (Harvey 2005), increased pressure is put on the territorial boundaries of the nation state. The social integration of newcomers has accordingly emerged as an important political subject in the last few decades, channelled through questions of how cultural and religious diversities should be addressed and on what basis immigrants should be permitted residence (Kymlicka 1995; Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010).

On the political arena, the question of immigrant integration has gained more attention in recent decades. In 2010, for example, when Angela Merkel expressed in a speech that the multiculturalist approach in Germany has failed (*Merkel says German multicultural society has failed* 2010), she pinpointed an ongoing trend shift in European migration and integration politics. Merkel's public proclamation could partly be seen as an indication of a growing concern among European politicians to find new strategies to counteract, what is described as, a growing social segregation, increased socioeconomic inequality and social exclusion – which is often associated with ethnic and cultural fragmentation in modern democracies (see e.g. Koopmans 2010). Merkel's statement also, perhaps above all, relates to the current

discursive shift in European politics regarding immigrant integration (Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010). As an alternative to the traditional dichotomy between the multicultural approach on the one hand and the assimilationist approach on the other hand, *civic integration*<sup>1</sup> has emerged as a new strategy in several European countries in the last two decades (for further conceptual and theoretical discussions on civic integration, see e.g. Bertossi 2011; Goodman 2014; Jacobs & Rea 2007; Joppke 2007a; Koopmans 2010; Phillips 2007).

Civic integration is an expression of immigrant incorporation in a recipient country, which, in addition to economic and political integration, also includes individual commitment to the knowledge, norms and traditions that characterize the host country (Carrera 2006). In contrast to assimilation, the civic integration strategies do not, necessarily, promote cultural affinity but stress the importance of functional autonomy within the societal context (Goodman 2010). The strategies used to enhance civic integration are often based on various tests that examine language skills, country knowledge and social values.

The scholarly debate on the subject has mainly been characterized by the ambition to classify and understand the scope of civic integration policies (CIPs), and empirical studies on the *effects* of the introduction of such policies have been quite rare (but for exceptions, see Baldi & Goodman 2015; Goodman 2010; Goodman

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& Wright 2015; Joppke 2007a). However, in a recent study, Goodman and Wright (2015) assessed the effects of CIPs on immigrants' socio-political and economic integration. The authors found 'little evidence that immigrant integration is impacted by civic integration, either positively or negatively' (Goodman & Wright 2015: 1902). This is revealing, given that the implementation of CIPs has mainly been motivated based on concerns about immigrant integration.

Still, as also discussed by Goodman and Wright (2015; see also Goodman 2014), it is possible that although CIPs have limited impact on immigrant integration, they do have other consequences. If CIPs do not serve as a vehicle for internal inclusion – do they instead constitute a mechanism for selective regulation of immigrant admission, i.e. external exclusion?

This article develops and conducts a preliminary test of the argument that CIPs affect migration flows. The theoretical part discusses how CIPs provide states with tools to control and limit the inflow of immigration by certain category of entry. The assumption is that conditional integration requirements make it more difficult for some immigrants to meet the established standards, which results in a reduced inflow of affected immigrants.

The next section develops a theoretical framework that describes the causal mechanisms through which CIPs can be expected to have an impact on immigrant admission. While it, at the first glance, seems paradoxical that integration policies could affect immigration, as migration occurs earlier than integration in an ordinary immigration process, there are nevertheless some components of CIPs that are conditional relative to entry and continued residence and may therefore constitute a hurdle for some immigrants to settle on a long-term basis in the recipient country. The theoretical framework distinguishes between family migration and labour migration, since CIPs may have different influences in different stages of the process for these different kinds of migration.

Although the data that are available to date do not allow for a rigorous test of the framework, we use the existing data in a preliminary analysis. This analysis lends support to the theoretical framework by showing that there are connections between the extensions of CIPs and reductions in family and labour immigration among European countries. As such, it complements previous qualitatively oriented works and comparative/single case studies (e.g. Goodman 2014; Permoser 2012) in pointing also to the implications of CIPs for immigration numbers in European countries.

## A theoretical framework for studying the implications of CIPs on the admission of immigrants

### *The spread of CIPs*

Without having agreed on a single concept, scholars more or less place the new approach of immigrant integration in between multiculturalism and assimilation. Given that this discursive displacement occurs simultaneously with a strong liberal paradigm in western democracies, some scholars describe this as a liberal integration strategy of anti-discrimination policies (see e.g. Carrera 2006; Joppke 2010; Michalowski & Van Oers 2012; Mouritsen 2011). There are also several components included in contemporary strategies for immigrant integration that are based on liberal ideologies and values. What is perhaps particularly characteristic, as outlined further on, is the emphasis on the fundamental values of a liberal democracy on the one hand and the fear of a withering of

the nationhood on the other hand (Goodman 2014; Jacobs & Rea 2007; Joppke 2007a). In this argumentation, liberal values such as equality are articulated in contrast to pluralism, suggesting that these concepts are practically incompatible (Joppke 2010). A main concern associated with pluralism is the potential weakening of the labour force and consequently the risk of economic stagnation based on this differentiation (Koopmans 2010; Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010). This approach is related to the opinion that multiculturalism generates politics of difference and poor integration outcome. In addition, this positioning reflects the urgency in contemporary liberal democracies to lean on a strong collective society that converges in shared values and ideological preferences – a homogeneous civic nationhood (Goodman 2010; Joppke 2010).

Following Goodman (2010, 2014) and others (Borevi 2014; Joppke 2007a), we define CIPs as a particular set of policy instruments and integration requirements, specifically country knowledge and language skills, that are conditional towards various legal statuses, for example, at entry and for long-term residence. The strategies used to enhance civic integration are conducted through tests that examine language skills, country knowledge and social values. The character and scope of CIPs differ between countries. However, one prominent factor that unites some countries is the conditionality integrated into some of these policies. In some countries, to some extent, certain migrants are obligated to, for example, pass specific tests to gain long-term residence (Goodman 2014; Jacobs & Rea 2007).

The diffusion of CIPs in Europe has led researchers to discuss whether there is a policy convergence. Some scholars argued that the widespread implementation of CIPs in several European countries indicates a general convergence (see e.g. Green 2007; Joppke 2007b). Clearly, efforts have been made within the European Union (EU) to contribute to an overall harmonization in the field of immigrant integration, reducing cross-country differences. Odmalm (2007) referred to the EU directives on long-term residence permit (European Union 2003b) and family reunification (European Union 2003a) and stressed that these directives indicate a mutual legal and policy coordination.

However, research has shown that the spread of CIPs is too disaggregated to be described as a general convergence. Goodman (2014; see also Jacobs & Rea 2007), for example, argued that the spread of CIPs is limited to specific countries and that it is possible to discern tendencies of divergence rather than convergence.

This can be exemplified by comparing two diverging countries. The Netherlands, on the one hand, is often mentioned as the forerunner in the introduction of CIPs. As described by Prins and Saharso (2010), a growing debate in Dutch politics during the early 2000s was that immigrant integration had failed due to 30 years of multicultural policies. Consequently, Dutch immigrant integration policies have gradually become tougher, and the civic integration measures are now not only compulsory but have also become conditional towards the possibility of long-term residence (Goodman 2014; Joppke 2007b). In Sweden, on the other hand, newcomers are not obligated to pass any integration or language tests in order to acquire a prolonged residence permit. Thus, unlike the coercive features of CIPs, the Swedish model of integration leans on state support and recognition of immigrants' access to certain fundamental rights (Borevi 2014).

Given the uneven spread of CIPs across Europe, this article aims to conduct a preliminary test of the connection between CIPs and immigration inflows.

The EU directives on long-term residence permit (European Union 2003b) and family reunification (European Union 2003a) indicate

a mutual legal and policy coordination (Odmalm 2007) and could therefore be expected to lead to convergence. However, although the directives determine what rights immigrants should acquire during the application process, they do not restrict the national rules and criteria for residence permits (Huddleston & Boräng 2009). The EU Council Directive on family reunification (European Union 2003a), for example, declares the right to reunification of family members, which thus places state policies into a common legal framework. However, the directive states: 'A family member may be refused entry or residence on grounds of public policy' (Chapter IV Article 6). Thus, states can, despite the common EU framework, implement restrictions such as CIPs to affect the process of family immigration. As emphasized by scholars, regarding family migration and asylum, there are now EU directives that are legally binding on member states, but the EU law does not cover the potential migration control channelled through immigrant integration policies (Groenendijk 2006, 2011; Joppke 2010).

To examine in more detail how CIPs can impact on migration, the next section focuses on how CIPs can become relevant in different stages of the immigration process. The focus is on family migration and labour migration. The categories of asylum seekers and EU citizens are not studied in this article, since they are not affected by CIPs but subjected to other legal frameworks (Goodman 2010).

### ***CIPs and immigrant admission***

While CIPs are formally part of an integration strategy and not immigration control policies, they may constitute an aggravating factor for some immigrants to settle on a long-term basis in the recipient country due to the conditional components relative to entry and for continued residence (Goodman 2010; see also Goodman 2014). The conditionality of CIPs is likely to be of particular relevance in the case of family immigration. Family immigration includes migrants who intend to immigrate to a country based on the premise that a relative (called a sponsor) has a residence permit or citizenship in the country in which the migrant wants to come to (World Migration Report 2008). The most common type of family immigration is family reunification, which is the term for the process when family members aim to reunite with a sponsor who has settled in a host country. The second category of family immigration is family formation, which refers to the process when a citizen of a country wants to bring his or her partner from another non-European country (World Migration Report 2008).

In the family reunification process, CIPs intervene as a screen in several stages. First, it affects the initial stage where immigrants are applying for residence and thus affects the process where an immigrant is looking to qualify as a sponsor. Second, CIPs also affect immigrants who apply for residence on the basis of being related to a person who has a residence permit or citizenship in the country (Goodman 2014). In addition to this, CIPs have, in some countries, also been implemented in a type of pre-entry testing. In these cases, immigrants applying for family reunification are required to fulfil specific criteria, such as language skills, to precede their application in the recipient country (Huddleston *et al.* 2013). Thus, in several different phases, CIPs affect the family immigration process when it comes to family reunification, which, as expected here, could significantly obstruct their chances to be granted residence.

In comparison to other categories of immigration, family migration is especially exposed to CIPs, as the testing can occur at different stages – to gain sponsor status, for family reunification and in the cases where CIPs are imposed for family immigrants before entry.

When it comes to labour migration, the surrounding policy frameworks are different. European countries are stressing the importance of strengthening the working population through labour migration while the enthusiasm for other types of immigration is less tangible (Goodman 2010; World Migration Report 2008). In harsh economic notions, it is possible to distinguish between favourable and less favourable migrants; those who initially generate tax income – labour migrants – and those who to a greater extent raise the social expenditures (World Migration Report 2008). In the light of the demographic situation in Europe and the concerns about a reduced labour force, this aspect becomes all the more important (Bailey & Boyle 2004).

This perspective is also possible to discern in political discussions and in migration and integration policy implementations in several European countries, where states tend to promote labour migration with greater means of labour market integration, while asylum and family migration face restrictions (Joppke 2007a; World Migration Report 2008). This applies particularly to those classified as 'qualified immigrant workers', which is ascribed to some immigrants considered to acquire some special skills and thus is perceived as an asset to the workforce. In these cases, civic integration test is usually dispensed, as the immigrant is considered to qualify on merits. During the Sarkozy presidency, for example, France implemented an immigration subsidy for proactive skilled migrants, 'immigration choisie', which encouraged qualified immigrant workers to settle in France (Bennhold 2006).

Although the connection between CIPs and entry is present in more stages of the migration process of family migration as compared to that of labour migration, there is a potential connection between the extent of CIPs and variations in labour immigration as well or, more specifically, in long-term labour immigration. CIPs are directed to immigrants when applying for long-term residence, which affect immigrants who want to upgrade their work permit to a residence permit. Labour immigration is often seen as a temporary type of migration, which mutually benefits the state and the migrant for a short period (World Migration Report 2013). The acquisition of long-term residence is usually surrounded by more reservations, particularly in the contexts where CIPs and other conditional requirements are implemented. Thus, CIPs could be expected to affect labour immigrants' chances of being granted long-term residence permit.

It is, of course, possible to think about several factors that might influence, and interact with, changes in flows of immigration. Previous studies have, for example, established connections between immigration and variation in political environments (Fitzgerald, Leblang & Teets 2014) and citizenship policies (Leblang 2015). In addition, as suggested by Alarian and Goodman (2016), immigrants are likely to avoid certain destinations due to stringent requirements in general, i.e. the demand side of the immigration process is potentially affected by a variety of policy conditions. Still, bringing the above arguments together, there are reasons to believe that the introduction of CIPs makes it harder for certain migrants to meet the requirements for family migration and long-term residence permits and thus result in increased difficulties to achieve long-term residence or even enter in the first place. This has been suggested in the literature on CIPs (Goodman 2014; Goodman & Wright 2015; Guild, Groenendijk & Carrera 2009a; Joppke 2007a). There is also evidence of the gatekeeping function of civic integration for a few countries and certain types of migration, for example in Denmark (Strik *et al.* 2010) and in the Netherlands (Goodman 2014).

This article aims to contribute to this line of investigation by examining to which extent the introduction of CIPs is in fact related

to a reduction in immigration (of certain categories of entry) for all the European countries for which the relevant data are available. As such, it complements previous studies that have investigated state control of immigration via indirect policy mechanisms (e.g. Alarian & Goodman 2016; Fitzgerald, Leblang & Teets 2014; Leblang 2015). It is to this task that we now turn.

## CIPs and inflows of migrants

### Data

In countries where CIPs have been implemented, they affect immigrants in three phases: at entry (in the case of family migration) and when applying for long-term residence permit and eventually citizenship (Goodman 2010). In this article, we focus on the first two, concerning immigrants' chances to enter and settle. In the following, we therefore analyse the relationship between the introduction of CIPs and the change in a) family immigration and b) long-term labour immigration between 2004 and 2011.

Since the specific design of CIPs differs depending on the category of immigrants the policies are primarily directed at, we look at two different civic integration measures. The variables of CIPs are constructed through an aggregation of measurements that represent different kinds of civic tests and accompanying requirements. Data that measure types of integration requirements are collected from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). MIPEX provides a 27-country study that systematically codes different kinds of requirements at the various entrance gates. In this article, the measures of CIPs are composed based on indicators from the MIPEX dataset of 2010. CIPs were mainly implemented in the relevant countries during the period 2005–2009, e.g. in France 2006–2008 and in Germany 2008–2009 (Huddleston *et al.* 2013). Hence, in order to capture the main diffusion of CIPs, the data from 2010 constitute the basis for the cross-section analysis.

MIPEX distinguishes between CIPs relative to when they affect different categories of immigrants at different stages of the process. This enables an operationalization of CIPs based on the categories of family immigration and long-term residence. This article utilizes the data provided by MIPEX and constructs indicators of CIPs that are directed towards family migration and long-term labour migration. The scores have been reversed, meaning that low results indicate few or generous policies and high results indicate extensive or strict policies.

The questions asked by MIPEX to the national policy frameworks have been converted into three categories (0, 50 or 100), which correspond to the national policies concerning different conditions. The variables of CIPs include, for example, language test. In the MIPEX data collection, the question of 'Form of language requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory' is decoded into three categories based on how the answer matches the policies in each country: 0='no requirement or voluntary course/information', 50='requirement to take a language course', 100='requirement includes conditional language test/assessment' (Huddleston *et al.* 2013). The values of the variables of CIPs shall therefore be interpreted accordingly: the higher the score, the more rigorous requirements for immigrants to acquire access and long-term residence permit.

In short, our measure of CIPs for family immigration includes requirements such as pre-departure language measure for family member abroad, language requirement for sponsor and/or family

member after arrival on territory and other integration requirements for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory e.g. social/cultural (see Appendix A). Our measure of CIPs for long-term residence includes requirements such as language requirement, other integration requirement e.g. social/cultural and cost of language/integration requirement (see Appendix B).

In addition to policies associated with civic integration, family immigration is framed by a series of rules and regulations, both of which place demands on the sponsor and also the family members who seek admission as relatives. These rules differ between European countries and may involve how long an immigrant needs to have resided in a country in order to qualify as a sponsor and different requirements for income, housing, etc. (Huddleston *et al.* 2013). If a country, for example, has introduced stricter obligations the sponsor needs to fulfil, such as income and housing requirements, it can be expected to affect the inflow of family migration to the same extent as CIPs. Thus, it is necessary in the analysis to include and control for other policies for family immigration. Accordingly, we have constructed an index that combines CIPs and other types of requirements for family migrants, including eligibility, accommodation and economic resources. The variable *Integration policies for family immigration* represents an additive index of Appendices A and C.

This design to separate CIPs from other integration requirements is motivated by two reasons. First, the implementation of CIPs in some European countries has taken place in a recent time period. Second, the theoretical input suggesting that the conditional testing included in CIPs could lead to reduced immigration by certain category of entry has not been tested. These circumstances have led us to distinguish CIPs and to construct separate variables.

The data on migration flows were collected from OECD (2006, 2008, 2013). As Bartram (2005: 46) has noted, '[m]igration researchers routinely complain about the quality of data, especially regarding its comparability'. For long, there has also been good reason to complain since the reliability and comparability problems are often severe for the available data (for a discussion, see e.g. Boräng 2018). It has been even more problematic to obtain reliable data immigration in different categories of entry. More recently, however, OECD has developed new sets of 'standardised' statistics. The intention behind these new series is to make immigration statistics more comparable across countries (OECD 2007).

The data show the number of immigrants permitted residence and are presented by category of entry, which enables a separation between family and long-term labour immigration.<sup>2</sup> From these data, we construct variables that show the *change* in family immigration and labour immigration (in per cent) between 2004 and 2011.

Unfortunately, the availability of data that measure the inflow of immigrants by category of entry is still limited to a relatively small number of countries.<sup>4</sup> We have sufficient data from 13 European countries. Obviously, this limited data set does not allow us to control for potential background factors or to bolster the study with better statistical control. Hence, it is important to stress that there are several circumstances, e.g. push and pull factors, that affect flows of migration. The models in this study do not take into account how the expected covariance coincides with other influencing variables – if the connections can be derived to causal effects when controlling for multiple factors – which makes it hard to determine anything else then if the variables are connected to each other. While this is not ideal, there are two reasons why we do not need to be too pessimistic about the possibilities to draw valid conclusions.

First, we looked only at West European countries. To be able to derive immigration via policy mechanisms, one could claim that the



countries need to be comparatively similar in terms of localization, geopolitics and political conditions. A limitation of this kind is therefore strategic and based on the purpose of trying to eliminate other potential interacting factors. For example, we exclude in the analysis countries with a settler history, a factor that has been shown to influence migration policy development (Freeman 1995). In addition, given the efforts that are made in terms of harmonizing migration policy within Europe, existing differences and emerging divergence between European states are all the more interesting to study.<sup>4</sup>

Second, and more importantly, we measured *change* in inflows after the introduction of CIPs and not the *level* of inflows. Looking at levels of inflows would have posed higher demands on controlling for confounders such as historical and legal factors. However, if the introduction of CIPs can be shown to be related to changes in a country's level of immigration, this could be a finding of interest even if we were unable to control for all the factors that determine countries' relative openness to immigration.

### Analysis

Figure 1 shows the relationship between introduction of CIPs for family immigration and changes in family immigration between 2004 and 2011. On the right hand side, there is a group of countries that combine the introduction of strict CIPs with a reduced inflow of family migrants between 2004 and 2011, i.e. Switzerland, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Austria. Notably, all countries that have not implemented CIPs, except Norway, had an *increase* in family immigrants during the same period of time. Both Portugal and Finland had an increase in the inflow of family immigration of >150% during the time period.

This result could be expressed in an alternative way. Table 1 lists the average change in family immigration between 2004 and 2011 for two groups of countries: those who have introduced CIPs for family immigration during this period and those who have not done so. The difference between the two groups of countries is striking: on average, countries that introduced CIPs for family immigration decreased their intake of family migrants by 43%, while countries where CIPs for family immigration were not introduced instead *increased* their intake of family migrants by 58%.

To contrast this result, the next step is to test the connection between change in family immigration and the aggregated variable of integration policies for family immigration (illustrated in Figure 2). The dependent variable of family immigration runs along the y-axis, and the independent variable of integration policies for family immigration runs along the x-axis.

The result shows a strong correlation between integration policies for family immigration, i.e. the combination of civic integration measures and other conditional requirements such as housing and income, and variations in family immigration between 2004 and 2011. In other words, countries that combine the two types of measures are the ones with the greatest reductions in inflows. However, there are some deviations from the line of best fit. This is perhaps most evident when comparing Norway with the Netherlands and France, which shows a similar change in family immigration during the studied period but has a much lower level of integration requirements than the other two countries. Nevertheless, with the exception of some countries, especially Portugal and Finland, the countries are relatively close to the slope.

Comparing Figure 2 with the model of CIPs for family immigration in Figure 1, it becomes clear that countries tend to combine CIPs




Figure 1. CIPs for family immigration and changes (%) in family immigration during 2004-2011 (sources: MIPEX 2013; OECD 2006, 2013)

CIPs=civic integration policies.




Figure 2. Integration policies for family immigration and changes (%) in family immigration during 2004-2011 (sources: MIPEX 2013; OECD 2006, 2013)

Table 1. Average changes (%) in family immigration during 2004-2011 grouped by countries that have and have not introduced CIPs for family migration (sources: MIPEX 2013; OECD 2006, 2013)

	Introduced CIPs	Not introduced CIPs
Change in family immigration during 2004-2011 (%)	-43	+58

CIPs=civic integration policies.

with relatively high levels of other integration requirements, with the exception from some deviant cases. For example, the UK and Italy combine relatively high values of integration policies for family reunification with no CIPs for family immigration.

While the suggested connection between integration policies and family migration is rather straightforward, due to multiple points of impact of integration policies, the theoretical framework suggests a




Figure 3. CIPs for long-term residence and change (%) in long-term labour immigration during 2004–2011 (sources: MIPEX 2013; OECD 2006, 2013)  
CIPs=civic integration policies.

Table 2. Average changes (%) in long-term labour immigration during 2004–2011 grouped by countries that have and have not introduced CIPs for long-term residence (sources: MIPEX 2013; OECD 2006, 2013)

	Introduced CIPs	Not introduced CIPs
Change in long-term labour immigration during 2004–2011(%)	-12	+201

CIPs=civic integration policies.

perhaps less evident but nevertheless real connection also between CIPs and certain kinds of labour migration; namely, *long-term* labour migration.

Figure 3 shows the relationship between introduction of CIPs for long-term residence and change in the intake of long-term labour migrants between 2004 and 2011.

There is a group of countries, such as Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Austria, that combines the introduction of strict CIPs with decreased immigration between 2004 and 2011. Italy deviates from this pattern. Interestingly, all countries that have *not* introduced CIPs for long-term residence – Finland, Belgium, Norway and Sweden – have increased their intake of long-term labour migrants during this time period.

That the relationship between CIPs and long-term labour migration is so strong may be surprising given the stronger demand for labour migration compared to family migration or forced migration. However, it is important to note that only long-term labour migration is studied here – short-term labour migration may also have increased during the same period. It seems clear, however, that CIPs strike against not only family migrants but also labour migrants who wish to settle in the country in which they work.

Table 2 lists the average change in long-term labour immigration between 2004 and 2011 for two groups of countries: those who have introduced CIPs for long-term residence during this period and those who have not done so. This table displays a strong growth in long-term labour migration for the countries that have not introduced

CIPs targeting long-term residence, whereas countries that have introduced CIPs on average have reduced their inflows.

Overall, the analysis indicates that CIPs are connected to a reduced inflow of affected categories of immigrants in the studied period. Regarding family migration, however, the results also show that countries that have introduced a *combination* of CIPs and other policies for family immigration are the ones where the reduction has been the greatest. This issue could be examined further. One suggestion could be that CIPs and other integration requirements have an interactional effect on each other and on variations of immigration by a certain category of entry. Another idea is that high levels of conditional integration requirements are preceded by other factors, which influence the connection between integration requirements and immigration.

Furthermore, the models in this article do not take into account how the covariance coincides with other influencing variables – if the connections can be derived to causal effects when controlling for multiple factors. The current lack of adequate data blocks the possibility to test for causality using a reliable statistical method. If or when suitable data are made available, a favourable design would be to carry out a multivariate regression analysis in order to further estimate the independent effect of one type of requirements under control for another.

## Conclusion

The spread of CIPs has been uneven across Europe, with some countries adopting civic integration strategies with tougher integration requirements for family immigration and long-term residence, while others keeping more of a multicultural approach.

As discussed earlier, general conventions such as the EU directive on the right of family reunification (European Union 2003a) require states to allow family reunification, which more or less obstructs states to place restrictions on this type of immigration. However, family members may be refused entry by the prevailing public policy. The fragment entails that states, despite the common framework, can implement restrictions, as the requirements in CIPs, to affect the process of family immigration.

Therefore, while on the one hand, CIPs can be seen as a political action that aims to emancipate immigrants and to provide them with tools for better adjustment to the host country, on the other hand, it also has the potential to work as a strategy to limit and control the inflow and settlement of migrants.

This article has developed and provided a preliminary test of the argument that CIPs affect migration flows. While the available data do not allow for a more thorough statistical analysis, the results lend preliminary support to the idea that there are connections between the extensions of CIPs and reductions in family immigration and labour immigration among European countries. As such, it complements previous qualitatively oriented works and case studies (e.g. Goodman 2014; Permoser 2012) in pointing to the implications of CIPs for immigration numbers in European countries. It also complements previous studies that have investigated how different policy measures provide states with mechanisms of control over immigration flows (e.g. Alarian & Goodman 2016; Fitzgerald, Leblang & Teets 2014; Leblang 2015). For future research, an important step forward would be to in detail disentangle the relative effects of various measures – something that would demand a more detailed analysis of the cases and employing data, more exactly, over where in the process presumptive family migrants are facing obstacles.

The urgency of integrating immigrants into becoming functional and contributing agents of the society – the instrumental impulsion – is discernible in much of the rhetoric pervading the civic integration strategy (Joppke 2007b). In the light of the demographic situation and changing composition of the workforce in Europe, many countries are also emphasizing concerns about labour market integration of newcomers. As Joppke and others claimed, the labour market's focus of social inclusion of immigrants fits with the increasingly importance of competitiveness in liberal democracies (see also Goodman 2010).

A functional strategy towards social and economic inclusion has consequently been the imposition of liberalisation and increasing demands of economic self-support in the immigrant integration process. According to Joppke (2007a), immigrants are, to a larger extent in several countries, expected to assimilate to liberal values and subjugate to the frames of the liberal economy. This strategy can be symbolized by the implementation of CIPs, which requires immigrants to satisfy specific standards of integration. As suggested in this article, an implied function of this policy framework is that immigrants who do not meet the conditions will face difficulties acquiring residence. This connection has been illustrated earlier, indicating that push for internal inclusion tends to come along with barriers of exclusion.

Given the economic importance of labour migration in the context of a greying Europe, it could be expected that CIPs would be more strongly connected to family migration than to labour migration. However, we also find a strong negative correlation between CIPs and long-term labour migration.

The diffusion of civic integration strategies can be interpreted as a paradoxical liberal response to the backlash against multiculturalism. On the one hand, liberal democracies that introduce CIPs stress internal inclusion and social cohesion and on the other hand, they tend to drift towards external exclusion of migrants.

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## Appendix A. CIPs for family immigration (source: MIPEX, 2013 [<http://www.mipex.eu/download-pdf>])

	CONDITIONS FOR ACQUISITION OF STATUS	Option 1	Option 2	Option 3
1	Form of pre-departure language measure for family member abroad (if no measure, leave blank)	No Requirement OR Voluntary course/ information	Requirement to take a language course	Requirement includes conditional language test/ assessment
2	Level of language requirement (if no measure, leave blank) (not weighted)	A1 or less set as standard	A2 set as standard	B1 or higher set as standard OR no standards, based on administrative discretion.
3	Form of pre-departure integration measure for family member abroad, ex. not language, but social/cultural (if no measure, leave blank)	None OR voluntary information/course	Requirement to take an integration course	Requirement to pass an integration test/ assessment

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## Notes

1. The term 'civic integration' (*inburgering*) was initiated in the Netherlands in connection to the implementation of the Newcomers Integration Act (*Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers*) in 1998 (Joppke 2007a).
2. When the OECD estimates the inflow of immigrants in a country, it includes immigrants who are granted a long-term residence permit (Lemaitre, Liebig & Thoreau 2006). For this reason, the independent variables of civic integration policies consist of civic test and accompanying requirements, targeting immigrants at entry and those applying for long-term residence permit. Note that the term long-term residence permit does not fully correspond to the meaning of permanent residence in this study.
3. Although the number of countries included in this database increases over time, we are limited to the countries for which we have data from the years prior to the introduction of civic integration policies.
4. It should be noted that within Europe, not only EU member states participate in free movement regimes. Even the Nordic countries have had an agreement on free labour mobility since the 1950s and the European Economic Area includes Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway besides the EU member states. Switzerland has bilateral free movement agreements with the EU.

**Appendix A. CIPs for family immigration**  
(source: MIPEX, 2013 [<http://www.mipex.eu/download-pdf>])

	CONDITIONS FOR ACQUISITION OF STATUS	Option 1	Option 2	Option 3
4	Pre-departure requirement exemptions (if no measure, leave blank) a. Takes into account individual abilities ex. educational qualifications b. Exemptions for vulnerable groups ex. age, illiteracy, mental/physical disability	Both of these	One of these	Neither of these
5	Cost of pre-departure requirement (if no measure, leave blank)	No or nominal costs	Normal costs	Higher costs
6	Support to pass pre-departure requirement (if no measure, leave blank) a. Assessment based on publicly available list of questions or study guide b. Assessment based on publicly available course	a and b	a or b	Neither a nor b
7	Cost of support (if no measure or support, leave blank)	No or nominal costs	Normal costs	Higher costs
8	Form of language requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory (if no measure, leave blank)	No Requirement OR Voluntary course/ information	Requirement to take a language course	Requirement includes conditional language test/ assessment
9	Level of language requirement, (if no measure, leave blank) (not weighted)	A1 or less set as standard	A2 set as standard	B1 or higher set as standard OR no standards, based on administrative discretion.
10	Form of integration requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory ex. not language, but social/cultural	No Requirement OR Voluntary course/ information	Requirement to take an integration course	Requirement includes integration test/assessment
11	Language/integration requirement exemptions (if no measure, leave blank) a. Takes into account individual abilities ex. educational qualifications b. Exemptions for vulnerable groups ex. age, illiteracy, mental/physical disability	Both of these	One of these	Neither of these
12	Cost of language/integration requirement (if no measure, leave blank)	No or nominal costs	Normal costs	Higher costs
13	Support to language/integration requirement (if no measure, leave blank) a. Assessment based on publicly available list of questions or study guide b. Assessment based on publicly available course	a and b	a or b	Neither a nor b
14	Cost of support (if no measure or support, leave blank)	No or nominal costs	Normal costs ex. If provided by state, same as regular administrative fees. If provided by private sector, same as market price in countries	Higher costs



**Appendix B. CIPs for long-term residence**  
(source: MIPEX, 2013 [<http://www.mipex.eu/download-pdf>])

	CONDITIONS FOR ACQUISITION OF STATUS	Option 1	Option 2	Option 3
1	Form of language requirement (if no measure, leave blank)	No Requirement OR Voluntary course/ information	Requirement to take a language course	Requirement includes conditional language test/ assessment
2	Level of language requirement (if no measure, leave blank) (not weighted)	A1 or less set as standard	A2 set as standard	B1 or higher set as standard OR no standards, based on administrative discretion.
3	Form of integration requirement ex. not language, but social/cultural	No Requirement OR Voluntary course/ information	Requirement to take an integration course	Requirement includes integration test/ assessment
4	Language/integration requirement exemptions (if no measure, leave blank) a. Takes into account individual abilities ex. educational qualifications b. Exemptions for vulnerable groups ex. age, illiteracy, mental/physical disability	Both of these	One of these	Neither of these
5	Cost of language/integration requirement (if no measure, leave blank)	No or nominal costs	Normal costs	Higher costs
6	Support to language/integration requirement (if no measure, leave blank) a. Assessment based on publicly available list of questions or study guide b. Assessment based on publicly available course	a and b	a or b	Neither a nor b
7	Cost of support (if no measure or support, leave blank)	No or nominal costs	Normal costs ex. If provided by state, same as regular administrative fees. If provided by private sector, same as market price in countries	Higher costs

**Appendix C. Other integration policies for family immigration**  
(source: MIPEx, 2013 [<http://www.mipex.eu/download-pdf>])

	ELIGIBILITY, CONDITIONS FOR ACQUISITION OF STATUS, AND SECURITY OF STATUS	Option 1	Option 2	Option 3
1	Eligibility for ordinary legal residents	≤ 1 year of legal residence and/or holding a residence permit for ≤ 1 year	> 1 year of legal residence and/or holding a permit for > 1 year	≥ 2 years of legal residence and/or holding a permit for ≥ 2 years
2	Documents taken into account to be eligible for family reunion	Any residence permit	Certain residence permits excluded	Permanent residence permit
3	Eligibility for partners other than spouses: a. Stable long-term relationship b. Registered partnership	Both	Only one or only for some types of partners (ex. homosexuals)	Neither. Only spouses.
4	Age limits for sponsors and spouses	≤ Age of majority in country (18 years)	> 18 ≤ 21 years with exemptions	> 21 years OR > 18 years without exemptions
5	Eligibility for minor children (<18 years) a. Minor children b. Adopted children c. Children for whom custody is shared	All three	Only a and b	A and b but with limitations
6	Eligibility for dependent relatives in the ascending line	Allowed	Certain conditions (other than dependency) apply	Not allowed
7	Eligibility for dependent adult children	Allowed	Certain conditions (other than dependency) apply	Not allowed
8	Accommodation requirement	None	Appropriate accommodation meeting the general health and safety standards	Further requirements
9	Economic resources requirement	None or at/below level of social assistance and no income is excluded	Higher than social assistance but source is not linked with employment	Linked to employment/no social assistance
10	Maximum length of application procedure	≤ 6 months defined by law	> 6 months but the maximum is defined by law	No regulation on maximum length
11	Costs of application and/or issue of status	None	Same as regular administrative fees and duties in the country	Higher costs
12	Duration of validity of permit	Equal to sponsor's residence permit and renewable	Not equal to sponsor's residence permit but ≥ 1 year renewable permit	< 1 year renewable permit or new application necessary
13	Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status: a. Actual and serious threat to public policy or national security, b. Proven fraud in the acquisition of permit (inexistent relationship or misleading information). c. Break-up of family relationship (before three years) d. Original conditions are no longer satisfied (ex. unemployment or economic resources)	No other than a-b	Grounds include c	All grounds and others than those included on the list, such as d and others
14	Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal or withdrawal a. reasoned decision b. right to appeal c. representation before an independent administrative authority and/or a court	All rights	At least a and b	One or both of a and b are not guaranteed

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